A double benefit of biodiversity in agriculture

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Résumé

Dans le cadre d’un modèle bio-économique dynamique et spatialisé, cet article analyse comment une fiscalité publique incitative en termes de subventions et de taxes sur les décisions d’assolements des agriculteurs peut favoriser la biodiversité. Les politiques publiques optimales définies sous contraintes budgétaire et environnementales sont étudiées à l’aune des coûts privés et publics qu’elles génèrent. Le modèle est calibré sur la France métropolitaine à l’échelle de la Petite Région Agricole (PRA) et utilise les oiseaux communs nicheurs comme mesure de la biodiversité. Les résultats mettent en évidence une relation décroissante et concave entre les performances économiques des agriculteurs et les contraintes écologiques. Les résultats montrent aussi que pour l’État les politiques optimales génèrent, en plus du bénéfice environnemental, un second bénéfice imputable à un gain budgétaire. Une redistribution régionale de ce gain permettrait de compenser les agriculteurs les plus touchés et de favoriser l’acceptabilité d’introduire des objectifs de biodiversité dans les politiques agricoles.

Mots-clés Biodiversité, Usage des sols, modélisation bio-économique, Approche coût-efficacité, Politiques publiques optimales, scénario, Oiseaux

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Abstract

This paper examines the role played by biodiversity goals in the design of agricultural policies. A bio-economic model is developed with a dynamic and multi-scale perspective. It couples biodiversity dynamics, farming land-uses selected at the micro level and public policies at the macro level based on financial incentives for land-uses. The public decision maker provides optimal incentives with respect to both biodiversity and budgetary constraints. These optimal policies are then analyzed through their private, public and total costs. The model is calibrated and applied to metropolitan France at the Small Agricultural Region (SAR) scale using common birds as biodiversity metrics. Results put forward a decreasing and concave efficiency curve for different biodiversity indicators and economic scores stressing the underlying bio-economic trade-off. The analysis of total and public costs also suggests that accounting for biodiversity can generate a second benefit in terms of public budget. It is argued how a regional redistribution of this public earning to the farmers could promote the acceptability of biodiversity goals in agricultural policies.

Keywords: Biodiversity, Land-use, Bio-economics, Modeling, Cost-effectiveness, Optimality, Scenarios, Birds.

JEL: Q15, Q20

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A double benefit of biodiversity in agriculture

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Abstract
This paper examines the role played by biodiversity goals in the design of agricultural policies. A bio-economic model is developed with a dynamic and multi-scale perspective. It couples biodiversity dynamics, farming land-uses selected at the micro level and public policies at the macro level based on financial incentives for land-uses. The public decision maker provides optimal incentives with respect to both biodiversity and budgetary constraints. These optimal policies are then analyzed through their private, public and total costs. The model is calibrated and applied to metropolitan France at the Small Agricultural Region (SAR) scale using common birds as biodiversity metrics. Results put forward a decreasing and concave efficiency curve for different biodiversity indicators and economic scores stressing the underlying bio-economic trade-off. The analysis of total and public costs also suggests that accounting for biodiversity can generate a second benefit in terms of public budget. It is argued how a regional redistribution of this public earning to the farmers could promote the acceptability of biodiversity goals in agricultural policies.

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1. Introduction
In many European countries, a strong decline of biodiversity is observable in agricultural landscapes. This is especially documented for mammals in Flowerdew & Kirkwood (1997), for arthropods and plants in Sotherton & Self (2000) or for birds in Donald et al. (2001). Numerous studies (Chamberlain et al. 2000, Wretenberg et al. 2007) identify the changes in agricultural systems over the last decades and especially the intensification processes at play as major drivers of this erosion. Breeding bird populations are particularly vulnerable to global agricultural change (Jiguet et al. 2010, Krebs et al. 1999). Such a negative effect is due mainly to a degradation in habitat quality altering nesting success and survival (Benton et al. 2003). In this context, the European Union has
formally adopted the Farmland Bird Index (FBI) as an indicator of structural changes in biodiversity (Balmford et al. 2003).

A challenge to reach sustainability for agricultural land-use is therefore to reconcile farming production and farmland biodiversity. Usual approaches to achieve such multifunctional goals for farming rely on public policies (Pacini et al. 2004) or economic incentives (Drechsler et al. 2007, Mouysset et al. 2011a). For Alavalapati et al. (2002) and Shi & Gill (2005), financial incentives are essential for convincing farmers to adopt eco-friendly activities. These policies modify the farmer’s choices and thus impact both the habitat and the dynamics of biodiversity (Doherty et al. 1999, Holzkamper & Seppelt 2007, Rashford et al. 2008). In this perspective, many public policies including agri-environmental schemes have been proposed by decision makers. However, fifteen years after the initial implementation of such instruments at a large scale, their ability to enhance biodiversity remains controversial (Butler et al. 2009, Kleijn et al. 2006, Vickery et al. 2004). These policies face a variety of difficulties. From the ecological point of view, insufficient knowledge about the agro-ecological processes at play and the focus on a few emblematic species limits the results. From the economic point of view, the weak acceptability by the farmers constitutes a major obstacle for the effectiveness of these policies. In this context, testing the efficiency of the different agricultural policy scenarios through quantitative methods and models is useful. The Cost-Benefit method (Boardman et al. 2005) compares the costs and the benefits of a policy using monetary values. However, quantifying the economic benefits of an agricultural policy is particularly difficult for complex biodiversity (Diamond & Hausman 1994). The cost-Effectiveness analysis, which avoids monetary evaluation, appears as a relevant alternative. This method, based on optimization under constraint, leads to defining either the less expensive policy satisfying a biodiversity goal or the policy with the best biodiversity performance under budgetary constraint (Naidoo et al. 2006). Many authors (Drechsler et al. 2007, Polasky et al. 2008; 2005) using this method for agricultural policy issues exhibit a Pareto-efficient frontier of optimal policies. As in Green et al. (2005) this frontier is generally concave pointing out a trade-off occurring between biodiversity and economic scores. In other words, it is possible to moderately improve biodiversity performance with reduced income losses (Barraquand & Martinet 2011, Lewis et al. 2011, Polasky et al. 2005).

The objective of this paper is to contribute to accounting for biodiversity goals in the design of agricultural policies. More specifically, cost-effective policies are designed and analyzed through different costs to identify potential ways to reduce the trade-off and improve the acceptability of such policies. The study relies on a spatio-temporal bio-economic model which articulates farming land-uses selected by rational agents, biodiversity community dynamics at micro (landscape) level and macro (typically national) financial incentives associated with land-uses. This paper extends the works of Mouysset et al. (2011a) by focusing on optimal public policies under different biodiversity constraints. More precisely, a public decision maker is assumed to set an optimal vector of taxes and/or subsidies for the different agricultural land-uses which maximizes
the present value of the national income under different biodiversity targets and a budgetary constraint. As in Semaan et al. (2007), this allows to assess the private, public and total social costs of the biodiversity targets associated with each optimal policy. The method is applied to the metropolitan France case study. The calibration relies on a French time series of the abundance of 34 birds and 14 farming land-uses over the years 2001-2009 and 620 small agricultural regions (SAR) in metropolitan France. Two indicators, the Farmland Bird Index (FBI) which has been adopted by the European Union (Balmford et al. 2003), and the Community Trophic Index (CTI) which informs on a functional feature of the community (Mouysset et al. 2012, Pauly et al. 1998) capture the biodiversity scores. The study illustrates that the efficiency curves of the agricultural policies with biodiversity constraints have different qualitative shapes according to the ecological indicators. The analysis of the total and public costs shows that the integration of biodiversity goals is not detrimental to the whole society in the sense that it can generate a benefit in terms of public budget. In other words, the biodiversity-oriented policy yields a double benefit. We suggest that the redistribution of the induced earnings to the farmers could compensate their private loss and so increase their acceptance of biodiversity objectives in the design of agricultural policy. A first strategy is proposed through regional redistribution.

The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the bio-economic model. The third section presents the case study. The fourth and fifth sections are respectively devoted to the results and their discussion.

2. The bio-economic modeling

Depicted by figure 1, the bio-economic model focuses on the interaction between a public decision maker at the macro (national) scale with farmers at the micro (regional) scale who impact bird population dynamics.

2.1. The biodiversity model

The biodiversity model is based on population dynamics of a community of species, denoted by $s$, with intra-specific competition depending on habitat and especially on agricultural land-use set by regional farmers, denoted by $r$. To each regional farmer corresponds a region and then a specific habitat. A Beverton-Holt function is selected for sake of simplicity. It captures intra-specific competition through a carrying capacity parameter as follows:

$$N_{s,r}(t + 1) = N_{s,r}(t)(1 + R_{s,r}) \left(1 + \frac{N_{s,r}(t)}{M_{s,r}(t)} \right)^{-1}$$

where $N_{s,r}(t)$ stands for the abundance of species $s$ in region $r$ at year $t$. The $R_{s,r}$ coefficient corresponds to the intrinsic growth rate specific to a given species $s$ in region $r$. The product $M_{s,r}(t) \times R_{s,r}$ represents the carrying capacity of the habitat associated to the region $r$ and the value $M_{s,r}(t)$ captures the ability of this habitat to host the species $s$. The habitat parameter $M_{s,r}(t)$ is assumed to
depend on the farming land-uses $A_{r,k}(t)$ where $k$ stands for the different types of land-use a farmer can implement. We have:

$$M_{s,r}(t) = b_{s,r} + \sum_k a_{s,r,k}A_{r,k}(t)$$

Consequently, the $a_{s,r,k}$ and $b_{s,r}$ coefficients, specific to each species, inform on how such species $s$ responds to agricultural land-use $k$ in a region $r$. The $b_{s,r}$ coefficient can be interpreted as the mean habitat coefficient for a species $s$ in a region $r$ and integrates other factors such as the proportion of forests or urban areas.

The indicators used to assess ecological performance are computed through the abundances $N_{s,r}(t)$ of the species at play. We denote the biodiversity index by $Biod$ without specifying it at this stage. Such a formulation includes usual biodiversity indices such as species richness, simpson or trophic indices. In each region, it is defined as follows with $s = 1, ..., S$:

$$Biod_r(t) = h(N_{1,r}(t), ..., N_{S,r}(t))$$

## 2.2. The economic model

We consider a public decision maker at a national scale interacting with $r$ regional farmers in a two stage model. In the first stage, the planner sets its optimal incentive scheme in terms of taxes or subsidies applied to different types of land-uses by maximizing the aggregate income of all region under global budgetary and biodiversity constraints. In the second stage, regional farmers chooses optimally their land-uses to maximize their rent without taking account the impact of their decision on biodiversity. The model is solved backward, beginning with stage two.

The income of a representative regional farmer $r$ at year $t$ is denoted by $Inc_r(t)$. It relies on the expected gross margin per unit of scale $gm_{r,k}$, current proportions of the Utilized Agricultural Area ($uaa_r$) dedicated to the agricultural land-uses $A_{r,k}(t)$ and incentives $\tau_k$ (taxes with $\tau_k < 0$ or subsidies with $\tau_k > 0$) which takes form of a percentage of gross margins as follows:

$$Inc_r(t) = \sum_k (1 + \tau_k).gm_{r,k}.A_{r,k}(t)$$

For each year $t$, the regional farmer choose its agricultural land-uses $A_{r,k}(t)$ in order to maximize its income $Inc_r(t)$ according to capital and rigidity constraints and for a given incentive scheme $\tau_k$.

$$\max_{A_{r,k}} Inc_r(t) = \max_{A_{r,k}} \sum_k (1 + \tau_k).gm_{r,k}.A_{r,k}(t)$$

under the constraints

$$|A_{r,k}(t) - A_{r,k}(t-1)| \leq \varepsilon A_{r,k}(t-1)$$
\[
\sum_k A_{r,k}(t) = uaa_r(t_0)
\]  

(7)

The rigidity constraint (6) restricts the area that the farmer can modify at each time for each agricultural land-use \( k \). The parameter \( \varepsilon \) captures change costs or inertia. The constraint (7) ensures that the total utilized agricultural area \( uaa_r \) is kept fixed. This maximisation program is solved numerically and yields an implicit reaction function for \( A_{r,k}(t) \) depending on the parameters of the model, namely the incentive \( \tau_k \), the gross margins \( gm_{r,k} \), the total area \( uaa_r \), the inertia parameter \( \varepsilon \) and the value of land-use in the previous period. This implicit function can be written as:

\[
A_{r,k}(t) = A_{r,k}(uaa_r, \varepsilon, gm_{r,k}, \tau_k, A_{r,k}(t - 1))
\]  

(8)

Now consider the behavior of the public decision maker in stage one. It is assumed that he\( \text{or she} \) evaluates the performance of public incentives \( \tau \) through the present value \( PV(\tau) \) of the national incomes \( Inc(t) \) discounted at the rate \( \rho \) from the first year of the projection \( t_1 \) to the final time horizon \( T \). Thus the present value is defined by:

\[
PV(\tau) = \sum_{t=t_1}^{T} \rho^{t-t_1} \cdot Inc(t)
\]  

(9)

where the national incomes \( Inc(t) \) is the sum of the product of micro (regional) incomes \( Inc_r(t) \) with the utilized agricultural area \( uaa_r \) in every region \( r \):

\[
Inc(t) = \sum_r uaa_r \cdot Inc_r(t)
\]  

(10)

In this first stage, the public decision maker acts as a leader of Stackelberg and takes into account the reaction function of each regional farmer when setting the optimal vector of taxes and subsidies incentives \( \tau_k \) defined as percentages of the gross margins \( gm_{r,k} \).

The intertemporal maximisation program of the public decision maker is to choose optimal taxes and/or subsidies for different agricultural land-uses \( k \) by maximizing the present value \( PV(\tau) \)

\[
\max_{\tau} PV(\tau)
\]  

(11)

under the reaction function of the regional farmers (12), the budgetary (13) and biodiversity (14) constraints:

\[
A_{r,k}(t) = A_{r,k}(uaa_r, \varepsilon, gm_{r,k}, \tau_k, A_{r,k}(t - 1))
\]  

(12)

\[
Budg(t) \leq Budg(t_0)
\]  

(13)

\[
Biod(T) \geq B_{lim}
\]  

(14)
The budgetary constraint (13) ensures that the public budget at each time $t$ does not exceed the current budget at time $t_0$. The budget $Budg(t)$ is computed according to the different incentives $\tau_k$ as follows:

$$Budg(t) = \sum_r \sum_k uaa_r \cdot gm_{r,k} \cdot A_{r,k}(t) \cdot \tau_k$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)$$

The ecological target (14) is based on a conservation limit $B_{lim}$ for the biodiversity goal imposed only at the temporal horizon $T$. Different values of $B_{lim}$ can be tested between the maximal feasible biodiversity$^1$ $B_{lim} = B^*$ and the lowest value $B_{lim} = 0$.

The optimal incentives, solutions of the problem (11) to (14) are denoted by:

$$\tau^*(B_{lim}) = \operatorname{Argmax}_{\tau \text{ admissible}} PV(\tau)$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)$$

2.3. Public, private and social biodiversity costs

The public policies induce two kinds of cost as proposed by Semaan et al. (2007): public and private costs. Analyzing such costs is helpful for evaluating the price of the different policies for the entire society and the weight dedicated to each part (public and private agents). The public cost denoted by $PuC(B_{lim})$ corresponds to the public budget of an optimal policy allocated to the agents at each time $t$. It depends on the biodiversity target $B_{lim}$ as the budget is itself a function of the optimal incentives $\tau^*(B_{lim})$. The public cost reads as follows:

$$PuC(B_{lim}) = \sum_{t=t_1}^{T} \rho^{t-t_1} \cdot Budg^*(t)$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)$$

where $Budg^*$ stands for the optimal budget in the following sense:

$$Budg^*(t) = \sum_k uaa_r \cdot gm_{r,k} \cdot A_{r,k}(t) . \tau^*(B_{lim})$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)$$

where the terms $A_{r,k}(t)$ given by (12) depend on the optimal incentive $\tau^*(B_{lim})$.

By contrast, the private cost $PrC(B_{lim})$, based on the loss of farmer income due to biodiversity requirements, is computed as the difference between the maximum feasible present value $PV(\tau^*(0))$ without a biodiversity target and the present value $PV(\tau^*(B_{lim}))$ under biodiversity goal $B_{lim}$:

$$PrC(B_{lim}) = PV(\tau^*(0)) - PV(\tau^*(B_{lim}))$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)$$

$^1$This maximum $B^*$ is defined by a biodiversity maximisation with respect to the vector of fiscal incentives in the range -100% and +100% and under the budgetary constraint:

$$B^* = \max_{-1 \leq \tau_k \leq 1} Biod(\tau) \hspace{1cm} (16)$$

where $Biod(\tau)$ is the biodiversity function.
The total social cost \( \text{SoC}(B_{\text{lim}}) \) is defined as the sum of the public and the private costs:

\[
\text{SoC}(B_{\text{lim}}) = PuC(B_{\text{lim}}) + PrC(B_{\text{lim}})
\]  

(21)

The question whether these costs are positive or not is decisive for the acceptability of biodiversity requirements and the adoption of eco-friendly agricultural policies.

### 2.4. Costs at regional scale

The different costs are computed at the micro scale in a similar way. The cost-effective budget \( Budg^*_r(t) \) is defined by

\[
Budg^*_r(t) = \sum_k u_{aa\tau} \cdot g_{m_{r,k}} \cdot A_{r,k}(t) \cdot \tau^*(B_{\text{lim}})
\]

(22)

while the micro public cost \( PuC_r(B_{\text{lim}}) \) corresponds to

\[
PuC_r(B_{\text{lim}}) = \sum_{t=t_1}^{T} \rho^{t-t_1} \cdot Budg^*_r(t)
\]

(23)

The micro (regional) private cost \( PrC_r(B_{\text{lim}}) \), based on the regional present value \( PV_r(\tau) \), evaluates the loss of earnings due to the ecological objective

\[
PrC_r(B_{\text{lim}}) = PV_r(\tau^*(0)) - PV_r(\tau^*(B_{\text{lim}}))
\]

(24)

where

\[
PV_r(\tau) = \sum_{t=t_1}^{T} \rho^{t-t_1} \cdot Inc_r(t)
\]

(25)

Finally the regional total social cost is the sum between the regional public and private costs:

\[
\text{SoC}_r(B_{\text{lim}}) = PuC_r(B_{\text{lim}}) + PrC_r(B_{\text{lim}})
\]

(26)

### 3. The French case study

#### 3.1. Context

We apply this bio-economic modeling framework to metropolitan France. France is split into 620 small agricultural regions (SAR). A SAR is part of a department (a major French administrative entity) which exhibits an agro-ecological homogeneity. This consistency from both the ecological and economic points of view makes the SAR the relevant regional scale for economic and biodiversity models. Ecological and economic data are available from 2001 to 2008 \( t_0 \). The policy scenarios are tested between \( t_1 = 2009 \) and \( T = 2050 \). Selecting a shorter timeframe could consequently hide interesting long-term effects due to the inertia of the models. As compared to Mouysset et al. (2011a), the precision of the model has thus been reinforced thanks to a refined spatial scale (from regional to SAR) for every bio-economic data and a refinement of the classes used in the agricultural and economic data. In other words, the model now accounts for many local specificities through the calibration process.
3.2. Biodiversity data

As regards biodiversity, we focus on common bird populations and related indicators (Gregory et al. 2004). Although the metric and the characterization of biodiversity remain an open debate (MEA 2005), such a choice is justified for several reasons (Ormerod & Watkinson 2000): (i) Birds lie at a high level in the trophic food chains and thus capture the variations in the chains. (ii) Birds provide many ecological services, such as the regulation of rodent populations and pest control, thus justifying our interest in their conservation and viability (Sekercioglu et al. 2004). (iii) Their close vicinity to humans makes them a simple and comprehensive example of biodiversity for a large audience of citizens.

The STOC (French Bird Breeding Survey) database\(^2\) provides information related to the bird abundances across the whole country. Abundance values for each species are available\(^3\) for the period 2001-2008. Among the species monitored by this large-scale long-term survey, we selected 34 species which have been classified according to their habitat requirements at a Europe scale (European Bird Census Council 2007). Table 2 lists the 14 habitat generalist species and the 20 farmland specialist species used as a reference by the European Union (Gregory et al. 2004).

3.3. Economic data

For agro-economic data, we use the French agro-economic classification OTEX (orientation technico-economique) developed by the French Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN)\(^4\) and the Observatory of Rural Development (ODR)\(^5\). This organization distinguishes between 14 classes of land-use named OTEX detailed in table 1. Each SAR is a specific combination of these OTEX. The surfaces dedicated to the 14 land-uses OTEX and the associated fiscal bases (tax return) used as a proxy of gross margins for the years 2001 to 2008 are available on the ODR website under a private request. Gross margin is an economic index broadly used in agricultural economics (Lien 2002). For accelerating the numerical computations, the public decision variables \(\tau_k\) are restricted to only two incentives: the cereal incentive \(\tau_{cop}\) is dedicated to arable lands (Otex (1) in table 1) and the grassland incentive \(\tau_{grass}\) is applied to non-intensive grassland systems (Otex (4), (5), (6), (7) in table 1). The gross margins \(gm_{r,k}\) are computed as the temporal mean of the historical gross margins:

\[
\begin{align*}
gm_{r,k} &= \frac{1}{8} \sum_{t=2001}^{2008} gm_{r,k}(t)
\end{align*}
\]

\(^2\)See the Vigie-Nature website http://www2.mnhn.fr/vigie-nature/. Standardized monitoring of spring-breeding birds at 1747 2 * 2 km\(^2\) plots across the whole country. Details of the monitoring method and sampling design can be found in Jiguet (2009).

\(^3\)For each species, a spatial interpolation of the abundance data is performed to obtain relative abundance values for each possible square in the country (Doxa et al. 2010). We then average the abundance values at the SAR scale.

\(^4\)http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/

\(^5\)https://esrcarto.supagro.inra.fr/intranet/
The budgetary constraint is calibrated with the current French CAP budget.

3.4. Model calibration

The agro-ecological parameters $R_{s,r}$, $a_{s,r,k}$ and $b_{s,r}$ introduced in equations (1)-(2) and the economic parameter $\epsilon$ of equation (6) are determined by a calibration based on a least square method. Hence are minimized errors between the observed outputs and the outputs derived from the model. The considered outputs of the model are the land-use values $A_{r,k}(t)$ for the economic model and the bird abundances $N_{s,r}(t)$ for the ecological model as detailed in Mouysset et al. (2013; 2011a). The discount rate is set to $\rho = 4\%$.

3.5. Biodiversity indicators

The biodiversity indicators used in this study are the Farmland Bird Index (FBI) and the Community Trophic Index (CTI) both evaluated in final year $T = 2050$. The Farmland Bird Index has been adopted by the European Community as the official environmental index, especially to analyze structural changes in biodiversity (Balmford et al. 2003). The relevance of the FBI to reflect the response of farmland biodiversity to agricultural intensification has been shown in Doxa et al. (2010), Mouysset et al. (2012). We compute the FBI at the national scale with 20 farmland specialist species for each SAR:

$$FBI(t) = \prod_{s \in \text{Specialist}} \left( \frac{N_{s,nat}(t)}{N_{s,nat}(2008)} \right)^{1/20}$$

(28)

where $N_{s,nat}(t) = \sum_{r=1}^{620} N_{s,r}(t)$ stands for the total abundance of species $s$ over the 620 SAR $r$.

The Community Trophic Index (CTI) informs on the average trophic level of a community as in Mouysset et al. (2012), Pauly et al. (1998). The CTI here integrates both the 14 generalist species and the 20 farmland specialist species (table 2). It is computed as the arithmetic mean of the exponential of the species trophic level$^6$ weighted by the relative abundances:

$$CTI_r(t) = \sum_s N_{s,r}(t) \frac{N_{s,r}(t)}{N_{tot,r}(t)} \cdot \exp(STI_s)$$

(29)

where $N_{tot,r} = \sum_{s=1}^{34} N_{s,r}(t)$ represents the total abundance of birds in a SAR $r$. The exponential function is used to better contrast communities with or without bird individuals of the higher trophic levels as in Mouysset et al. (2012). This indicator classifies the communities with more granivorous species (e.g. low trophic level) compared to the communities with more insectivorous and carnivorous species (e.g. high trophic level).

National CTI is the arithmetic mean of the 620 regional $CTI_r$:

$$CTI(t) = \frac{1}{620} \sum_r CTI_r(t)$$

(30)

$^6$See in Mouysset et al. (2012) for the Species Trophic Indices
4. Results

4.1. Efficiency curves

Figure 2 illustrates the bio-economic performance of the maximal present values under biodiversity and budgetary constraints. The red diamond corresponds to policy $\tau^*(0)$ without biodiversity constraint and the green plus in fig. 2(a) (cross in fig. 2(b) resp.) to the $\tau^*(FBI^*)$ policy ($\tau^*(CTI^*)$ resp.). The black plus (crosses resp.) represent the $\tau^*(FBI_{lim})$ policies (the $\tau^*(CTI_{lim})$ policies resp.). Their projection on the x-axis illustrates the level of the biodiversity constraint $B_{lim}$ and their projection on the y-axis shows the associated present value $PV(\tau^*)$. We observe two efficiency curves which are both decreasing with respect to biodiversity target $B_{lim}$ but with different shapes. The curve obtained with the FBI constraint in fig. 2(a) is almost linear. Hence, the increase of the FBI constraint leads to regular losses on the economic indicator. By contrast, the curve obtained with the CTI constraint in fig. 2(b) displays a concavity especially strong for the large biodiversity level $B_{lim}$. Hence the increase of the CTI constraint has limited impact on the economic indicators for CTI levels lower than 6.43. After this threshold, the economic loss becomes major.

4.2. Optimal public incentives

Tables 3 and 4 depict the optimal incentives with increasing biodiversity goals. For both ecological indices, we note a decrease in the cereal subsidies $\tau_{cop}$ with biodiversity objective $B_{lim}$. In particular, for the strongest biodiversity targets, the incentive becomes a tax. In contrast, the incentive for extensive grasslands $\tau_{grass}$ remains globally stable with a high value except for the policy with the more stringent CTI constraint namely $CTI^*$. Globally, these observations highlight the need to promote extensive grassland at the expense of crops to satisfy biodiversity objectives. According to the selected ecological indicator, this pattern is more or less emphasized.

Figure 3 illustrates the proportions of utilized agricultural area dedicated to the extensive grassland systems for the three extreme policies: the $\tau^*(0)$ policy in figure 3(a), the $\tau^*(FBI^*)$ policy in figure 3(b) and the $\tau^*(CTI^*)$ policy in figure 3(c). The $\tau^*(FBI^*)$ strategy promotes the grassland activities through an increase of SAR with important grassland proportions. The $\tau^*(CTI^*)$ incentives induce a development of SAR with moderate grassland proportions on contrary to the $\tau^*(0)$ option where the rate of intermediate SAR declines.

4.3. National costs

The figure 4 plots the total social costs $SoC(B_{lim})$ by detailing the public $PuC(B_{lim})$ (in red) and the private $PrC(B_{lim})$ (in blue) costs for the different optimal solutions. The dotted lines on the left correspond to the $\tau^*(0)$ policy (without biodiversity) and on the right to the $\tau^*(B^*)$ policy (biodiversity oriented). Figure 4 first highlights the fact that the public cost decreases while the private cost increases. These opposite effects are mainly due to the presence of
taxes on crops $\tau^*_\text{crop} < 0$ in the optimal policies when biodiversity goal is more demanding as captured by tables 3 and 4. In other words, taxes are good for the public budget while they are detrimental to private incomes as expected. This pattern is more contrasted with the CTI index than with the FBI. As regards the total social cost, of interest is the fact that it remains globally steady. This suggests that biodiversity requirements does not necessarily penalize the total social costs. FBI or CTI patterns are qualitatively close in this sense, although we note a slight decrease for the highest CTI constraints.

4.4. Regional costs

Figure 5 details the regional total social costs $SoC_r(B_{lim})$ at the regional scale for several public policies $\tau^*(B_{lim})$. Figure 5(a) stands for the $\tau^*(0)$ policy (without a biodiversity target). Figures 5(b), 5(c), 5(d) and 5(e) represent several $\tau^*(FBI_{lim})$ policies with two intermediate $B_{lim}$ for each biodiversity indicator. Finally, figures 5(f) and 5(g) depict the $\tau^*(B^*)$ policies. A complete pie-chart represents the maximum regional total costs (i.e. 2.5 millions Euros). It turns out that the regional social total costs remain stable among the optimal policies confirming the result obtained at macro scale. In other words, the biodiversity constraint does not affect the social cost, even at the more micro level. However, it can noted that this social cost differs between the regions.

Figure 6 presents the distribution of the regional total social costs $SoC_r(B_{lim})$ between the regional public costs $PuC_r(B_{lim})$ (in red) and the regional private costs $PrC_r(B_{lim})$ (in blue). According to the equation (20), there is no private biodiversity costs for the $\tau^*(0)$ policy. So we start directly with the $\tau^*(FBI_{lim})$ policies with two medium $B_{lim}$ for each indicator. Pink represents negative public costs, where taxes exceed subsidies. Pale blue represents negative private costs, i.e. the regional farmer income is larger than under the $\tau^*(0)$ policy without a biodiversity requirement. Finally, strong grey (pale grey, white resp.) regions which have very stationary (intermediary stationary, unstable resp.) costs among the cost-effective strategies.

Although the policies differently affect the regions, the patterns are qualitatively similar in every region and for the two indicators: when the biodiversity constraint is more stringent, the public cost decreases and the private cost increases. As suggested by figure 4, there is a strong complementarity between the two costs: regions where the public cost strongly decreases are those where the private cost strongly grows. Typically, the four regions (in white on figure 6) which have a historically strong specialization in arable lands are the most affected by “green” policies. Hence, for the strongest biodiversity targets, they generate an important public gain.

5. Discussion

5.1. The bio-economic trade-off

The bio-economic model developed in this study leads to the design of optimal policies with respect to budgetary and biodiversity constraints. The opti-
mal strategies maximize the aggregated intertemporal farming income or equivalently minimize the (global) private cost under a biodiversity target with a non-increasing budget. The cost-effective analysis of the policies with different objectives of biodiversity provides bio-economic efficiency curves. As stressed by figure 2 for the tested biodiversity indicators, the bio-economic trade-off is strictly negative. This suggests that integrating biodiversity goals in agricultural policies entails a loss of earnings for farmers as in Polasky et al. (2005), Drechsler et al. (2007), Lewis et al. (2011), Barraquand & Martinet (2011).

However, according to the biodiversity indicator, the shape of the efficiency curve slightly differs (fig. 2). The curves displayed in the literature (Barraquand & Martinet 2011, Polasky et al. 2005) are concave with a change of slope for high levels of the ecological score. We recover this pattern for the Community Trophic Index. In this context, it is possible to moderately improve the CTI without implying strong private costs for farming. The strongest biodiversity requirements imply a major decrease in farmer incomes. Such a change is explained by a switch in the incentives as captured by tab. 4): the strongest CTI goals impose a change in the optimum incentive set with smaller subsidies. As regards the FBI, the trade-off is clearly more linear. This is explained by the improvement of the FBI with a continuous decrease of crop incentives as detailed in tab. 3. With this second shape, it is not possible to improve the biodiversity performance, even moderately, without strongly affecting the income of the farmers. The diversity of these efficiency curves stresses the difficulty in selecting a policy among the optimal ones.

5.2. A second benefit of policies with biodiversity goals

The first benefit of policies with biodiversity goals is obviously the improvement of biodiversity performance. But public and social costs give insight into a second benefit. First, it turns out that the total cost does not rise in response to biodiversity requirements. This suggests that biodiversity is not detrimental for the overall (macro) economic performance. Second, such an assertion is reinforced by the study of the public cost. We observe that, for both biodiversity indicators, the increase in biodiversity objectives leads to a decrease in the farming public budget. In other words, the policies with demanding biodiversity goals entail a budgetary benefit. This occurs because the biodiversity target is more binding than the budgetary constraint. This effect is mainly implied by the taxes on crops in the optimal policies with biodiversity objectives. Therefore, it is possible to improve biodiversity performance while strengthening the public budget. As a consequence, this budgetary benefit could be redistributed to the farmers in order to compensate their private costs and loss of income. By reducing these private costs, their acceptability for adopting biodiversity goals in agricultural policies should be enhanced.

5.3. Regional redistribution of the budgetary benefit

However, this financial redistribution of the public gain questions the equity between the agents, or the spatial scale of the redistribution. The regional
analysis of the different costs provides a first answer to the second benefit redistribution. Indeed, the study shows that the stability of the total cost with respect to the biodiversity target also occurs at the regional scale. The policies do not affect all the regions with the same intensity but a gain between public and private costs is obtained for each region. As the regions with private losses are also those where the public cost decreases, a first redistribution mechanism emerges at the regional scale.

5.4. Perspectives and limitations

The objective of this study is to examine the role played by biodiversity goals on agricultural policies and symmetrically to help conservation biology to take socio-economic issues into account. In this vein, ecological-economic modeling is a fruitful framework to bring together social and natural sciences in order to tackle biodiversity management issues (Cooke et al. 2009) especially within an agro-ecological and terrestrial context. By stylizing the agro-ecological system, this kind of modeling leads to both improvements in understanding and reinforcement of decision-making supports by fostering the policy effectiveness (Mouysset et al. 2011b). The integration of dynamics and spatialization of the processes taken into account stresses their relevance. Moreover, the relative simplicity of the initial mechanisms underlying the model together with its multi-scale perspective should make it easily transferable to other case-studies and other biodiversity taxa.

However, the results presented in this paper should be viewed as suggestive rather than predictive elements. Some improvements could have a positive impact on the design of relevant policies and should be integrated in future developments. Taking into account more explicit spatial processes within the bio-economic model should reinforce the derived assertions. For example, accounting for the level of landscape fragmentation which affects both biodiversity dynamics (Tscharntke et al. 2005) and agricultural land-use policies (Hartig & Drechsler 2009, Polasky et al. 2008) should be a fruitful task. From the economic point of view, it would be accurate to account for price mechanisms. Typically, future profitabilities of agricultural activities can vary according to the influence of fuel prices or technical progress. Finally, allowing for dynamic incentives instead of fixed incentives could be a relevant way to improve the effectiveness of agricultural strategies as in Hartig & Drechsler (2009).

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Figure 1: Bio-economic model coupling. The decision maker determines an incentive scenario according to a bio-economic optimization. The farmers choose their agricultural systems by maximizing their income under technical constraints. These choices affect the habitat and the bird communities.
Figure 2: Optimal present values $PV(\tau^*(B_{lim}))$ with respect to the biodiversity constraint $B_{lim}$. In (a) with the FBI(2050) biodiversity indicator and in (b) with the CTI(2050) biodiversity indicator. The extreme policies $\tau^*(0)$ and $\tau^*(B^*)$ are in red and green respectively.
Figure 3: Proportions of the non-intensive grassland land-use (OTEX) \( \sum_{k=4}^{7} \frac{A_{c,k}(2050)}{u_{aa}} \) at the SAR scale for optimal policies under several biodiversity targets \( B_{lim} \). In green: 100-45%, in blue: 45-10%, in yellow: 10-0%.
Figure 4: Total social costs $SoC(B_{tim})$ separated between the public costs $PuC(B_{tim})$ in red and the private costs $PrC(B_{tim})$ in blue for different biodiversity targets $B_{tim}$. Dashed lines stand for the extreme cases $B_{tim} = 0$ on the left and $B_{tim} = B^*$ on the right.
Figure 5: Regional total social costs $SoC_r(B_{lim})$ in black under several biodiversity targets $B_{lim}$. On the left the FBI and on the right the CTI for the biodiversity index.
Figure 6: Regional public $PuC_r(B_{lim})$ (in red) and private $PrC_r(B_{lim})$ (in blue) costs under several biodiversity targets $B_{lim}$. Pink stands for negative public costs and pale blue negative private costs. Grey (resp. pale grey, white) regions present stable (resp. intermediary stable, instable) costs.
The 14 land-uses (OTEX) $k$

| 1 | Cereal, Oleaginous, Proteaginous (COP) |
| 2 | Variegated crops                      |
| 3 | Intensive bovine livestock breeding   |
| 4 | Medium bovine livestock breeding      |
| 5 | Extensive bovine livestock breeding   |
| 6 | Mixed crop-livestock farming with herbivorous management |
| 7 | Other herbivorous livestock breeding  |
| 8 | Mixed crop-livestock farming with granivorous management |
| 9 | Mixed crop-livestock farming with other management |
| 10| Granivorous livestock breeding        |
| 11| Permanent farming                     |
| 12| Flower farming                        |
| 13| Viticulture                           |
| 14| Others associations                   |

Table 1: List of the 14 farming land-uses (OTEX)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farmland Bird Species</th>
<th>Generalist Bird Species</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buzzard <em>Buteo buteo</em></td>
<td>Blackbird <em>Turdus merula</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cirl Bunting <em>Emberiza cirlus</em></td>
<td>Blackcap <em>Sylvia atricapilla</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn Bunting <em>Emberiza calandra</em></td>
<td>Blue Tit <em>Parus caeruleus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grey Partridge <em>Perdix perdix</em></td>
<td>Carrion crow <em>Corvus corone</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoopoe <em>Upupa epops</em></td>
<td>Chaffinch <em>Fringilla coelebs</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kestrel <em>Falco tinnunculus</em></td>
<td>Cuckoo <em>Cuculus canorus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lapwing <em>Vanellus vanellus</em></td>
<td>Dunnock <em>Prunella modularis</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linnet <em>Carduelis cannabina</em></td>
<td>Great Tit <em>Parus major</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meadow Pipit <em>Anthus pratensis</em></td>
<td>Green Woodpecker <em>Picus viridis</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quail <em>Coturnix coturnix</em></td>
<td>Golden oriole <em>Oriolus oriolus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red-backed Shrike <em>Lanius collurio</em></td>
<td>Jay <em>Garrulus glandarius</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red-legged Partridge <em>Alectoris rufa</em></td>
<td>Melodius Warbler <em>Hippolais polyglotta</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rook <em>Corvus frugilegus</em></td>
<td>Nightingale <em>Luscinia megarhynchos</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skylark <em>Alauda arvensis</em></td>
<td>Wood Pigeon <em>Columba palumbus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stonechat <em>Saxicola torquatus</em></td>
<td>Whinchat <em>Saxicola rubetra</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitethroat <em>Sylvia communis</em></td>
<td>Wood Lark <em>Lullula arborea</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellowhammer <em>Emberiza citrinella</em></td>
<td>Yellow Wagtail <em>Motacilla flava</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: List of the 20 farmland and 14 generalist bird species
Table 3: Optimal cereal incentives $\tau^{\ast}_{\text{cop}}$ and grassland incentives $\tau^{\ast}_{\text{grass}}$ for different biodiversity targets $B_{lim}$ using the FBI as biodiversity index.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$FBI_{lim}$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0.825</th>
<th>0.85</th>
<th>0.875</th>
<th>0.9</th>
<th>0.925</th>
<th>0.95</th>
<th>0.975</th>
<th>1</th>
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<tr>
<td>$\tau^{\ast}_{\text{cop}}$</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\tau^{\ast}_{\text{grass}}$</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>$CTI_{lim}$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>$CTI^*$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\tau_{\text{cop}}^*$</td>
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<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.37</td>
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<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\tau_{\text{grass}}^*$</td>
<td>0.52</td>
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<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Optimal cereal incentives $\tau_{\text{cop}}^*$ and grassland incentives $\tau_{\text{grass}}^*$ for different biodiversity targets $B_{lim}$ using the CTI as biodiversity index.
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