An Economic Mechanism to Regulate Multispecies Fisheries

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Un mécanisme économique pour gérer des pêcheries multi-espèces

Résumé
Nous étudions la gestion d’une pêcherie multi-espèces, exploitée par des pêcheurs utilisant une technologie de prélèvement non sélective. Nous construisons un mécanisme économique pour réguler la pêcherie. Pour un large éventail de modèles, incluant notamment la possibilité de concurrence imparfaite, d’externalité de congestion, de motivation pro-sociales et/ou d’aménité de la ressource, nous montrons que tout équilibre de Nash (stationnaire markovien) du jeu différentiel induit par notre mécanisme garantit une exploitation optimale de la ressource. En utilisant une spécification du modèle, adaptée de Clemhout and Wan (1985), qui peut être résolue explicitement, nous mettons en évidence un équilibre de Nash (stationnaire markovien) du jeu différentiel, prouvant par la même occasion l’existence d’équilibres de Nash (stationnaire markovien) dans cet environnement.

Mots-clés : Ressource naturelle; Tragédie des biens communs; Pêcherie multi-espèces; Jeu différentiel; Mécanisme économique.

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Abstract
We study the management of a multispecies fishery, exploited under a non-selective harvesting technology. We construct an economic mechanism to regulate the fishery. Under a large class of models, capable of accounting for imperfect competition, congestion externalities, pro-social motivations and/or resource amenities, we show that any (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the differential game induced by our economic mechanism implements an optimal utilization of the resource. Using a specification of the general model, which adapts Clemhout and Wan (1985) and can be solved explicitly, we exhibit a (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the differential game, proving existence of (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibria within this environment.

Keywords: Natural resource; Fish war; Multispecies; Differential game; Mechanism design.

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JEL: Q20; C73.

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1 Introduction.

In the simplest case of fisheries inhabited by a single species, many instruments have been proposed to eliminate the "tragedy of the commons" problem. These include entry limitation, licensing, taxes on catches or individual transferable quotas. In theory, all are capable of implementing an optimal consumption path of the fish population (Clark, 1990).

The use of these instruments to regulate fisheries inhabited by several interacting species is less clear. On the one hand, the determination of the optimal policy itself is complicated by the biological interdependences within the ecosystem and the fishermen's limited ability to alter the species composition of their catch (Squires et al., 1998). On the other hand, the data needed to determine and enforce the optimal policy, that is, observations of fishing efforts, fish catches and/or stocks (depending on which instrument is used), renders the regulation impracticable in most cases (Arnason, 1990).

Arnason (1990) expounds one way out of the information problem. He argues that all information required to determine the optimal policy is already available within the fishing industry. The fishing firms have knowledge about their own cost and harvesting function. Moreover, the competition within the industry stimulates an efficient use of the available biological data. All this suggests that fisheries management should largely rely on the fishermen themselves.

This paper follows this line of reasoning. Assuming nonselective harvesting, we propose an economic mechanism (Jackson, 2001) capable of implementing an optimal policy in a multispecies fishery. Under this mechanism, each participant is asked to decide both his own fishing effort and that of the other participants. Individualized prices are also set by the participants themselves. In equilibrium, the prevailing price system reflects the participants' expected future rents, at each point of time. Moreover, each participant pays his effort at a price equal to the sum of the others' individualized prices. Thus, in equilibrium, the participants internalize the external opportunity cost of their fishing effort. Finally, to ensure that the mechanism is balanced, each participant is paid his individualized price, on each unit of fishing effort by the others.

This paper contributes to the literature in three directions. First, as an illustration of our general model, we develop a variant of Clemhout and Wan (1985), by introducing harvest costs and nonselective harvesting technologies. This specification can be explicitly solved and, thus, serves as a benchmark example within the paper. Second, the paper shows that the economic mechanism constructed by Rouillon (2011), primarily designed to manage one species fisheries, can be generalized so as to also work for multispecies fisheries with nonselective harvesting. Third, the analysis is conducted within a continuous time setting, whereas Rouillon (2011) considered discrete time one.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the general biologic and economic model. Section 3 states the benchmark specification and calculates the open access and cooperative solutions. In section 4, we construct our economic mechanism to regulate the fishery and derive some of its properties. In section 5, we study the set of Nash equilibria of the associated difference game.
2 The model.

Consider a $I$-fishers and $J$-species model of a common property fishery. There are $I$ fishers $i = 1, 2, \ldots, I$. At each instant of time $t$, each fisher $i$ chooses his catch effort rate $e_i(t) \in \mathbb{R}_+$. There are $J$ species $j = 1, 2, \ldots, J$. The resource state at time $t$ is described with a vector $x(t) = (x_j(t))_{j=1}^{J} \in \mathbb{R}_+^J$. The initial state is a fixed constant $x_0 = (x_0)_j = (x_j)_{j=1}^{J} \in \mathbb{R}_+^J$. At each instant $t$, the resource state evolves according to the ordinary differential equation

$$\dot{x}(t) = f(e(t), x(t)), \quad x(0) = x_0,$$

(1)

where the function $f = (f_j)_{j=1}^{J}$ is defined on $\mathbb{R}_+^I \times \mathbb{R}_+^J$ and has values in $\mathbb{R}^J$.

Each fisher $i$'s objective is to maximize

$$\int_0^\infty u_i(e(t), x(t)) e^{-\delta_i t} dt,$$

(2)

where $u_i$ is an instant utility function, defined on $\mathbb{R}_+^I \times \mathbb{R}_+^J$ and having values in $\mathbb{R}$, and $\delta_i$ is a rate of time preference.

**Remark 1.** As a function of $e(t)$ and $x(t)$, the instant utility $u_i$ can account for imperfect competition, congestion externalities, pro-social motivations, resource amenities, and so on...

A stationary Markovian strategy for fisher $i$ is a function $s_i$ defined on $\mathbb{R}_+^J$ and having values in $\mathbb{R}_+$. A vector $s = (s_i)_{i=1}^{I}$ is called a strategic profile or a policy. It is said to be feasible if there exists a unique absolutely continuous state trajectory $x(t)$ satisfying (1), with $e(t) = s(x(t))$, for all $t$, and if the corresponding fishers’ objectives (2), for all $i$, are well defined (Dockner et al., 2000). Let $S$ be the set of feasible strategic profiles or policies.

For all feasible strategic profile $s = (s_i)_{i=1}^{I}$ and initial state $x_0$, let

$$W^i(s; x_0) = \int_0^\infty u_i(e(t), x(t)) e^{-\delta_i t} dt,$$

where:

$$\dot{x}(t) = f(e(t), x(t)), \quad x(0) = x_0,$$

$$e(t) = s(x(t)).$$

(3)

**Definition 1.** A stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium is a vector $s^* = (s_i^*)_{i=1}^{I} \in S$ such that, for all $i$, $s_i$ and $x_0$, $W^i(s^*; x_0) \geq W^i((s^*)/s_i; x_0)$, where $(s^*/s_i) = (s_1^*, \ldots, s_{i-1}^*, s_i, s_{i+1}^*, \ldots, s_I) \in S$. 

and show our implementation result.
For all feasible policy \( s = (s_i)_{i=1}^I \) and initial state \( x_0 \), let

\[
W(s; x_0) = \sum_{i=1}^I W^i(s; x_0) .
\]

(4)

**Definition 2.** An optimal policy is a vector \( s^0 = (s^0_i)_{i=1}^I \in S \) such that, for all \( s \in S \) and \( x_0 \), \( W(s^0; x_0) \geq W(s; x_0) \).

### 3 A benchmark specification.

In this section, as an illustration of the general model, we propose a tractable specification of our biologic and economic model. This framework allows us to explicitly characterize a stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium and the optimal policy, in Propositions 1 and 2 respectively.

We use a variant of Clemhout and Wan (1985), with two differences. First, we abandon their implicit assumption of a perfectly selective harvesting, and replace it by that of a nonselective harvesting technology. This assumption is more realistic in many fisheries (Squires et al., 1998). Second, we generalize the model by introducing a harvest cost, which was implicitly set equal to zero in Clemhout and Wan (1985).

**Remark 2.** Many models of multispecies fisheries in the literature, including the seminal contributions of Clemhout and Wan (1985) and Fischer and Mirman (1996), rely on the assumption of perfectly selective harvesting and zero harvesting costs. Models of multispecies fishery with nonselective harvesting and positive harvesting costs are Mesterton-Gibbons (1996) and Durohit and Chaudhuri (2004). However, none can be explicitly solved.

For simplicity, we assume here identical fishers in terms of technologies (cost of effort and production function) and preferences (instant utility function and rate of time preference) and we consider symmetric stationary Markovian Nash equilibria.

At each instant of time \( t \), each fisher \( i \) bears a cost \( c \) per unit of effort \( e_i(t) \), with \( c \geq 0 \), harvests each specie \( j \) in quantity

\[
h_{ij}(t) = q_j e_i(t) x_j(t) ,
\]

(5)

with \( q_j \geq 0 \), and derives a utility \( a_j \ln(h_{ij}(t)) \) from its consumption, with \( a_j \geq 0 \). Thus, for all \( i \), the instant utility function is specified as

\[
u_i(e(t), x(t)) = \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \ln(h_{ij}(t)) - ce_i(t) .
\]

(6)

The common rate of time preference is \( \delta_i = \delta \), for all \( i \).
For all $j$, the dynamics of the resource is represented by
\[
\dot{x}_j(t) = x_j(t) \left( \alpha_j - \sum_{k=1}^{J} \beta_{jk} \ln(x_k(t)) \right) - \sum_{i=1}^{I} h_{ij}(t)
\]
where $\alpha_j \in \mathbb{R}$, for all $j$, and $\beta_{jk} \in \mathbb{R}$, for all $j$ and $k$.

To characterize the resource dynamics, in the absence of harvesting, it is convenient to consider the change of variables $y = (y_j)_{j=1}^{J} = (\ln(x_j))_{j=1}^{J}$. Then, an equilibrium is a state $y^*$ such that $\sum_{k=1}^{J} \beta_{jk} y_k^* = \alpha_j$, for all $j$. A unique equilibrium will exist if, and only if, the determinant of the matrix $\beta = (-\beta_{jk})_{j,k=1}^{J}$ is not zero. It is globally stable if, and only if, the eigenvalues of the matrix $\beta$ have negative real parts. Both conditions are assumed to be true throughout the paper.

To state Propositions 1 and 2 below, we assume that there exists $A = (A_j)_{j=1}^{J} \in \mathbb{R}^J$ such that
\[
\delta A_j + \sum_{k=1}^{J} \beta_{kj} A_k = a_j, \text{ for all } j, \quad I \sum_{j=1}^{J} A_j q_j + c > 0.
\]

Proposition 1 below characterizes a stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium of the differential game.

**Proposition 1.** Let $e^* = \left( \sum_{j=1}^{J} a_j \right) / \left( \sum_{j=1}^{J} A_j q_j + c \right)$. The strategic profile $s^* = (s^*_i)_{i=1}^{I}$, where $s^*_i(x) = e^*$, for all $i$ and $x$, defines a stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium of the differential game.

**Proof.** We show that the policy $s^* = (s^*_i)_{i=1}^{I}$, where $s^*_i(x) = e^*$, for all $i$ and $x$, satisfies the HJB equation
\[
\delta V^i(x) = \max_{e_i \in \mathbb{R}_+} \left\{ \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J} a_j \ln(q_j e_i x_j) - c e_i}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} V_j^i(x) x_j \left( \alpha_j - \sum_{k=1}^{J} \beta_{jk} \ln(x_k) - q_j \right) (I-1) e^* + e_i} \right\},
\]
where
\[
V^i(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{J} A_j \ln(x_j) + B^*, \quad A_j = (1/\delta) \left[ a_j - \sum_{k=1}^{J} A_k \beta_{kj} \right], \text{ for all } j,
\]
\[
B^* = (1/\delta) \sum_{j=1}^{J} \left[ A_j \ln(q_j e^*) - 1 + A_j (\alpha_j - q_j (I-1) e^*) \right], \quad e^* = \left( \sum_{j=1}^{J} a_j \right) / \left( \sum_{j=1}^{J} A_j q_j + c \right).
\]

Here and below, $V_j^i(x)$ is the partial derivative of $V^i(x)$ with respect to $x_j$. 

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Here and below, $V_j^i(x)$ is the partial derivative of $V^i(x)$ with respect to $x_j$. 


Using $V^i_j (x) = A_j / x_j$, for all $j$, and rearranging, (9) becomes

$$
\delta V^i (x) = \max_{e_i \in \mathbb{R}_+} \left\{ \frac{\sum_{j=1}^J \left( a_j - \sum_{k=1}^J A_k \beta_{kj} \right) \ln (x_j)}{e_i} + \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \ln (x_j) + A_j \alpha_j - \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j (I - 1) e^* \right\}.
$$

It is immediate to verify that the control $e_i = s^*_i (x) = e^*$ satisfies the first order conditions

$$
\left( \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \right) / e_i - \left( \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j + c \right) = 0,
$$

and, thus, maximizes the RHS of (9). After substitution, (9) writes

$$
\delta V^i (x) = \sum_{j=1}^J \left[ \left( a_j - \sum_{k=1}^J A_k \beta_{kj} \right) \ln (x_j) + a_j \ln (q_j e^*) - 1 + A_j (\alpha_j - q_j (I - 1) e^*) \right].
$$

and, using

$$
A_j = (1/\delta) \left[ a_j - \sum_{k=1}^J A_k \beta_{kj} \right], \text{ for all } j,
$$

$$
B^* = (1/\delta) \sum_{j=1}^J \left[ a_j \ln (q_j e^*) - 1 + A_j (\alpha_j - q_j (I - 1) e^*) \right],
$$

we can confirm our conjecture that

$$
V^i (x) = \sum_{j=1}^J A_j \ln (x_j) + B^*.
$$

Proposition 2 below characterizes the optimal policy.

**Proposition 2.** Let $e^0 = \left( \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \right) / \left( I \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j + c \right)$. An optimal policy is $s^0 = (s^0_i)_{i=1}^I$, where $s^0_i (x) = e^0$, for all $i$ and $x$.

**Proof.** We show that the policy $s^0 = (s^0_i)_{i=1}^I$, where $s^0_i (x) = e^0$, for all $i$ and $x$, satisfies the HJB equation $^2$

$$
\delta V (x) = \max_{(e_i)_{i=1}^I \in \mathbb{R}_+^I} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^I \left[ \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \ln (q_j e_i x_j) - c e_i \right] + \sum_{j=1}^J V_j (x) x_j \left( a_j - \sum_{k=1}^J \beta_{jk} \ln (x_k) - q_j \sum_{i=1}^I e_i \right) \right\},
$$

where:

$$
V (x) = I \left[ \sum_{j=1}^J A_j \ln (x_j) + B^0 \right],
$$

$$
A_j = (1/\delta) \left[ a_j - \sum_{k=1}^J A_k \beta_{kj} \right], \text{ for all } j,
$$

$$
B^0 = (1/\delta) \sum_{j=1}^J \left[ a_j \ln (q_j e^0) - 1 + A_j \alpha_j \right],
$$

$$
e^0 = \left( \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \right) / \left( I \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j + c \right).
$$

$^2$Here and below, $V_j (x)$ is the partial derivative of $V (x)$ with respect to $x_j$. 

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Using $V_j(x) = IA_j/x_j$, for all $j$, and rearranging, (10) becomes

$$
\delta V(x) = \max_{(e_i)_{i=1}^I \in \mathbb{R}_+} \left\{ + \sum_{i=1}^I \left[ a_i \ln (e_i) - \left( I \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j + c \right) e_i \right] \right\}.
$$

It is immediate to verify that the control $(e_i)_{i=1}^I = (s_0^I(x))^I_{i=1} = (e^0)^I_{i=1}$ satisfies the first order conditions

$$
\left( \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \right) / e_i - \left( I \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j + c \right) = 0, \text{ for all } i,
$$

and, thus, maximizes the RHS of (10). Substituting, (10) writes

$$
\delta V(x) = I \sum_{j=1}^J \left[ (a_j - \sum_{k=1}^J A_k \beta_{kj}) \ln (x_j) + a_j \left( \ln (q_j e^0) - 1 \right) + A_j \alpha_j \right],
$$

and, using

$$
A_j = (1/\delta) \left[ a_j - \sum_{k=1}^J A_k \beta_{kj} \right], \text{ for all } j,
$$

$$
B^0 = (1/\delta) \sum_{j=1}^J \left[ a_j \left( \ln (q_j e^0) - 1 \right) + A_j \alpha_j \right],
$$

we verify that

$$
V(x) = I \left[ \sum_{j=1}^J A_j \ln (x_j) + B^0 \right].
$$

The literature often identifies the stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium with the open access solution and the optimal policy with the cooperative solution (Levhari and Mirman, 1980; Fischer and Mirman, 1996). A well-known result is that open access often leads to the "tragedy of the commons" (Gordon, 1954), i.e., to overfishing with respect to the cooperative solution. The following corollary of Propositions 1 and 2 displays a necessary and sufficient condition under which the "tragedy of the commons" arises within the framework considered here.

**Corollary 1.** There is overfishing (resp., underfishing) under the open access solution, with respect to the cooperative solution (i.e., $e^* > e^0$) if, and only if, $\sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j > 0$ (resp., $< 0$).

**Proof.** Immediate, remembering that $e^* = \left( \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \right) / \left( \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j + c \right)$ and $e^0 = \left( \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \right) / \left( I \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j + c \right)$. ■

Since this result is rather counter-intuitive and unusual, it may be worthwhile to display and characterize situations where the fishing effort is insufficient...
under the open access solution, with regard to the cooperative solution. Simple examples can be built within a predator-prey calibration, such that $J = 2$ and $\beta_{11} = \beta_{22} = \beta > 0$ and $\beta_{12} = -\beta_{21} = \gamma > 0$. For the sake of simplicity, we limit our attention to cases where $q_1 = q_2 = q > 0$. The linear system (8) yields

$$A_1 = \frac{(\beta + \delta) a_1 + \gamma a_2}{(\beta + \delta)^2 + \gamma^2} \quad \text{and} \quad A_2 = \frac{(\beta + \delta) a_2 - \gamma a_1}{(\beta + \delta)^2 + \gamma^2},$$

from which we obtain

$$\sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j = q \frac{(a_1 + a_2) (\beta + \delta) - (a_1 - a_2) \gamma}{(\beta + \delta)^2 + \gamma^2}.$$ 

Hence, according to Corollary 1, there is under-fishing whenever $(a_1 - a_2) \gamma > (\beta + \delta) (a_1 + a_2)$. Qualitatively, this occurs when the fishers have a strong enough preference for the prey (the difference between $a_1$ and $a_2$ is positive and sufficiently large) and when the interaction within the ecosystem is strong enough (the parameter $\gamma$ is sufficiently large), other things being equal. The intuition is as follows. Under a predator-prey interaction, it can be socially worthwhile to devote some fishing efforts in reducing the population of predators, in the present, for the sole purpose of increasing the population of preys, in the long run. However, this entails bearing a private cost of effort today, in counterpart of a future public benefit. Hence, the fishers have an incentive to free ride, unless the utility derived from the resulting catches compensate. This is not the case when the fishers have a strong enough preference for the prey.

4 The economic mechanism.

Here, we construct an economic mechanism (Jackson, 2001) aimed at regulating the fishery.

By definition, a mechanism is a pair $(M, \rho)$, consisting of a message space $M \equiv \times_{i=1}^I M_i$ and an outcome function $\rho$. Under the mechanism, each participant $i$ is asked to announce a message $m_i$ in $M_i$. The outcome function $\rho$ is a mapping from $M$ into $\mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R}_+$, which translates joint messages $m = (m_i)_{i=1}^I$ into efforts $(E_i(m))_{i=1}^I$ and transfers $(T_i(m))_{i=1}^I$ to be implemented by the participants.

The specific mechanism used below is as follows.

We let $M_i \equiv \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{R}_+$, for all $i$. A generic message of agent $i$ is denoted $m_i = ((E_{ik})_{k=1}^I, (P_{ik})_{k=1}^I)$.

The component $E_{ik}$ is interpreted as a fishing effort agent $i$ is willing for agent $k$. Likewise, the component $E_{ii}$ is a fishing effort that agent $i$ is willing for himself. The component $P_{ik}$ is a compensatory price that agent $i$ is proposing.

\textsuperscript{3}Thus, species 1 is the prey and species 2 the predator.
to pay to agent $k$ per unit of his own fishing effort. Finally, $P_{ik}$ is a compensatory price that agent $i$ is willing to receive per unit of the other participants’ fishing efforts.

Agent $i$’s fishing effort is given by

$$E_i(m) = \left( \frac{1}{I} \right) \max \left\{ 0, \sum_{k=1}^{I} E_{ik} \right\}. \tag{11}$$

In order to obtain the transfer to be paid by agent $i$, several steps are needed. To begin with, for all $k$, rearrange the sequence $(P_{ik})_{k=1}^{I}$ in ascending order. In case where $P_{ik} = P_{jk}$, for some $i$ and $j$, rearrange in ascending order of indexes. Then, define the agent $k$’s personalized price $P_k(m)$ as the $N$-th term of the ordered sequence, with $N = I/2$, if $I$ is even, and $N = (I + 1)/2$, if $I$ is odd.

Finally, agent $i$’s transfer is given by

$$T_i(m) = \sum_{j \neq i} P_j(m) E_i(m) - P_i(m) \sum_{j \neq i} E_j(m). \tag{12}$$

**Remark 3.** It is worth noting that the outcome function $\rho$ is continuous. Continuity is necessary for Nash equilibrium strategies to be robust to small errors in prediction and/or unwanted deviations or "trembles" in strategies (de Trenqualye, 1994).

The following properties of the mechanism will prove to be useful below.

**Property 1.** For all $m \in M$ and all $(e_k)_{k=1}^{I} \in \mathbb{R}^I_+$, each participant $i$ can report a message $m_i'$ such that $(E_k(m/m_i'))_{k=1}^{I} = (e_k)_{k=1}^{I}$ and $(P_k(m/m_i'))_{k=1}^{I} = (P_k(m))_{k=1}^{I}$, where $(m/m_i) = (m_1, ..., m_{i-1}, m_i', m_{i+1}, ..., m_I)$.

Property 1 means that under the mechanism, each participant is able to decide the efforts of everyone, without modifying the current system of individualized prices.

**Proof.** Pick $m \in M$ and $(e_k)_{k=1}^{I} \in \mathbb{R}^I_+$. Consider any agent $i$. Let $m_i' = \left( (E_{ik})_{k=1}^{I}, (P_{ik})_{k=1}^{I} \right)$ be such that, for all $k$, $E_{ik}' = Ie_k - \sum_{j \neq i} E_{jk}$ and $P_{ik}' = P_{ik}$. It is immediate that $E_k(m/m_i') = (1/I) \max \left\{ 0, E_{ik}' + \sum_{j \neq i} E_{jk} \right\} = e_k$ and $P_k(m/m_i') = P_k(m)$, for all $k$. $lacksquare$

**Property 2.** Assume that $I \geq 3$. Given any $(p_k)_{k=1}^{I} \in \mathbb{R}^I_+$, let $m \in M$ be any joint message such that $(P_{ik})_{k=1}^{I} = (p_k)_{k=1}^{I}$, for all $i$. Then, $(P_k(m))_{k=1}^{I} = (P_k(m/m_i'))_{k=1}^{I} = (p_k)_{k=1}^{I}$, for all $i$ and $m_i' \in M_i$.

Property 2 states that, whenever all agents announce the same system of individualized prices, the mechanism implements it and no unilateral deviation
by a single agent can modify it. (It is equivalent to say that, whenever all agents but one report the same price system, then the mechanism enforces it.)

**Proof.** Let \((p_k)_{k=1}^I \in \mathbb{R}^I_+\). Let \(m \in M\) be such that \((P_{ik})_{k=1}^I = (p_k)_{k=1}^I\), for all \(i\).

By definition, for all \(k\), \(P_k(m)\) is the \(N\)-th term of the sequence \((P_{ik})_{k=1}^I\), rearranged in ascending order of values, and then of indexes. Since \((P_{ik})_{k=1}^I = (p_k, \ldots, p_k)\), we have \(P_k(m) = p_k\).

Now, consider any \(i\) and \(m'_i \in M_i\). Let \((P'_{ik})_{k=1}^I\) be the associated vector of personalized prices announced by \(i\). By definition, for all \(k\), \(P_k(m/m'_i)\) is the \(N\)-th term of the sequence \((P_{ik}, \ldots, P_{(i-1)k}, P'_{ik}, P_{(i+1)k}, \ldots, P_{Ik})\), rearranged in ascending order of values, and then of indexes. The ordered sequence is

\[
(p_k, \ldots, p_k) \quad \text{if} \quad P'_{ik} = p_k,
(p_k, \ldots, p'_k) \quad \text{if} \quad p_k < P'_{ik}.
\]

In all cases, given that \(I \geq 3\), we obtain \(P_k(m/m'_i) = p_k\). ■

**Property 3.** For all \(m \in M\), \(\sum_{i=1}^I T_i(m) = 0\).

In other words, the mechanism \((M, \rho)\) is balanced.

**Proof.** For all \(m \in M\), notice that the transfer \(T_i(m)\) can also be written as

\[
T_i(m) = \sum_{j=1}^I P_j(m) E_i(m) - P_i(m) \sum_{j=1}^I E_j(m).
\]

Summing over \(i\), one directly obtains

\[
\sum_{i=1}^I T_i(m) = 0,
\]

proving that the mechanism \((M, \rho)\) is balanced. ■

## 5 Regulated Multispecies Fishery.

Suppose that the fishery is regulated by using repeatedly the mechanism defined above at each instant of time. With the dynamics of the resource state, this defines a differential game (Dockner et al., 2000), where the fishers' actions are reports of messages from their message space. Here, we define and analyse the stationary Markovian Nash equilibria of this differential game.

Consider the differential game induced by \((M, \rho)\). A stationary Markovian strategy for fisher \(i\) is a function \(\sigma_i\) defined on \(\mathbb{R}^I_+\) and having values in \(M_i\). A strategic profile \(\sigma = (\sigma_i)_{i=1}^I\) is feasible if there exists a unique absolutely
continuous state trajectory $x(t)$ satisfying (1), with $e(t) = (E_i (\sigma(x(t))))_{i=1}^I$, for all $t$, and if the resulting fishers' objectives (see (13) below), for all $i$, are well defined (Dockner et al., 2000). Let us denote $\Sigma$ the set of feasible strategic profiles.

For all feasible strategic profile $\sigma = (\sigma_i)_{i=1}^I$ and initial state $x_0$, define

$$J^i(\sigma; x_0) = \int_0^\infty [u_i (e(t), x(t)) - t_i(t)] e^{-\delta t} dt,$$

subject to:

$$\dot{x}(t) = f (e(t), x(t)), x(0) = x_0,$$

$$e(t) = (E_i (\sigma(x(t))))_{i=1}^I,$$

$$t_i(t) = T_i (\sigma(x(t))).$$

(13)

Definition 3 below adapts Definition 1 to the differential game associated with $(M, \rho)$.

**Definition 3.** A stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium of the differential game induced by $(M, \rho)$ is a vector $\sigma^* = (\sigma^*_i)_{i=1}^I \in \Sigma$ such that, for all $i, \sigma_i$ and $x_0$,

$$J^i(\sigma^*; x_0) \geq J^i((\sigma^*/\sigma_i); x_0),$$

where $(\sigma^*/\sigma_i) = (\sigma^*_1, ..., \sigma^*_i, \sigma_{i-1}, \sigma_{i+1}, ..., \sigma^*_I) \in \Sigma$.

5.1 Optimality.

Proposition 3 proves that a stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium of the differential game associated with the mechanism $(M, \rho)$ induces an optimal utilization of the resource. It is worth mentioning that this result holds under the general model described in Section 2.

**Proposition 3.** If $\sigma^*$ is a stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium of the differential game induced by $(M, \rho)$, then the policy $s^0 = (s^0_i)_{i=1}^I$, where $s^0_i(x) = E_i (\sigma^*(x))$, for all $i$ and $x$, is an optimal policy.

**Proof.** Let $\sigma^*$ be a stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium of the differential game induced by $(M, \rho)$.

Assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists an initial state $x_0$ and a feasible policy $s$ such that

$$W(s; x_0) > \sum_{i=1}^I J^i(\sigma; x_0).$$

(14)

Denote $e(t)$ and $x(t)$, for all $t$, the time paths of the fisher’s efforts and resource stock, respectively, associated with the policy $s$, starting from the initial state $x_0$.

By property 1, used at each point $x$, each fisher $i$ can find a strategy $\sigma_i$ such that, for all $x$,

$$\left( E_k ((\sigma^*/\sigma_i)(x)) \right)_{k=1}^I = (s_k(x))_{k=1}^I,$$

(15)

$$\left( P_k ((\sigma^*/\sigma_i)(x)) \right)_{k=1}^I = (P_k(\sigma^*(x)))_{k=1}^I.$$

(16)
From (15), it is clear that the strategic profile \((\sigma^*/\sigma_i)\) implements the same time paths of the fisher’s efforts and resource stock as the policy \(s\). Moreover, from (16), the associated time path of the price system is \((P_k ((\sigma^*/\sigma_i) (x(t))))_{k=1}^{t} = (P_k (\sigma^* (x(t))))_{k=1}^{t}\), for all \(t\). Thus, we have

\[
J_i((\sigma^*/\sigma_i), x_0) = \int_{0}^{\infty} [u_i(e(t), x(t)) - t_i(t)] e^{-\delta t} dt,
\]

where, for all \(t\),

\[
t_i(t) = T_i((\sigma^*/\sigma_i) (x(t))),
\]

\[
= \sum_{j \neq i} P_j (\sigma^* (x(t))) c_i(t) - P_i (\sigma^* (x(t))) \sum_{j \neq i} c_j(t).
\]

Considering a similar unilateral deviation \(\sigma_i\), by each player \(i\) in turn, and summing over \(i\), we get, by property 3,

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{I} t_i(t) = 0,
\]

and, therefore,

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{I} J_i((\sigma^*/\sigma_i), x_0) = \sum_{i=1}^{I} \int_{0}^{\infty} u_i(e(t), x(t)) e^{-\delta t} dt,
\]

\[
= W(s; x_0).
\]

Now, as \(\sigma^*\) is a Nash equilibrium, we have, for all \(i\),

\[
J_i(\sigma^*, x_0) \geq J_i((\sigma^*/\sigma_i), x_0),
\]

which implies, by summation over \(i\), that

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{I} J_i(\sigma^*, x_0) \geq \sum_{i=1}^{I} J_i((\sigma^*/\sigma_i), x_0).
\]

Together, (17) and (18) imply

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{I} J_i(\sigma^*, x_0) \geq W(s; x_0),
\]

which contradicts our assumption (14).

Finally, as \((M, \rho)\) is balanced, by property 3, and \(\sum_{i=1}^{I} J_i(\sigma^*, x_0) \geq W(s; x_0)\), for all \(s\) and \(x_0\), it follows that the policy \(s^0 = (s_i^0)_{i=1}^{I}\), where \(s_i^0(x) = E_i(\sigma^* (x)),\) for all \(i\) and \(x\), is an optimal policy.

5.2 Existence.

Considering the biologic and economic environment in Section 3, given by (6) and (7), Proposition 4 identifies a stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium to implement to the optimal policy, stated in proposition 2.
Proposition 4. Consider the biologic and economic environment described in Section 3. Let \( e^0 = \left( \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \right) / \left( I \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j + e \right) \) and \( p^0 = \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j \). The strategic profile \( \sigma^* = (\sigma^*_i)_{i=1}^I \), where \( \sigma^*_i (x) = \left( (e^0)_{i=1}^I, (p^0)_{i=1}^I \right) \), for all \( i \) and \( x \), defines a stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium of the differential game induced by \((M, \rho)\).

Proof. Consider the strategic profile \( \sigma^* = (\sigma^*_i)_{i=1}^I \), where \( \sigma^*_i (x) = \left( (e^0)_{i=1}^I, (p^0)_{i=1}^I \right) \), for all \( i \) and \( x \).

By definition of \((M, \rho)\), we have
\[
\begin{align*}
(E_i (m^*))_{i=1}^I &= (e^0)_{i=1}^I, \\
(P_i (m^*))_{i=1}^I &= (p^0)_{i=1}^I, \\
(T_i (m^*))_{i=1}^I &= (0)_{i=1}^I.
\end{align*}
\]

We must show that fisher \( i \)'s stationary Markovian strategy \( \sigma^*_i (x) = \left( (e^0)_{i=1}^I, (p^0)_{i=1}^I \right) \) satisfies the HJB equation, for all \( x \).

\[
\delta v (x) = \max_{m_i \in M_i} \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \ln (q_j E_i (m^*/m_i) x_j) - c E_i (m^*/m_i) - T_i (m^*/m_i) \right. \\
+ \left. \sum_{j=1}^J v_j (x) x_j \left( \alpha_j - \sum_{k=1}^J \beta_{jk} \ln (x_k) - q_j \sum_{k=1}^J E_k (m^*/m_k) \right) \right\},
\]
where
\[
v (x) = (1/I) V (x) = \sum_{j=1}^J A_j \ln (x_j) + B^0.\]

From property 1, fisher \( i \) can find \( m_i \) to attain any vector of efforts \( (E_k (m^*/m_i))_{k=1}^I = (e_k)_{k=1}^I \in \mathbb{R}_+^I \). From property 2, whatever the unilateral deviation \( m_i \) by fisher \( i \), \( (F_k (m))_{k=1}^I = (F_k (m/m^*_i))_{k=1}^I = (p^0)_{k=1}^I \). Therefore, to prove that \( \sigma^*_i (x) \) is fisher \( i \)'s best-reply, it will be sufficient to show that \( (e^0)_{k=1}^I = (e^0)_{k=1}^I \) satisfies, for all \( x \),

\[
\delta v (x) = \max_{(e_k)_{k=1}^I \in \mathbb{R}_+^I} \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \ln (q_j e_j x_j) - (I - 1) p^0 + c e_i + p^0 \sum_{k \neq i} e_k \right. \\
+ \left. \sum_{j=1}^J v_j (x) x_j \left( \alpha_j - \sum_{k=1}^J \beta_{jk} \ln (x_k) - q_j \sum_{k=1}^J E_k (e^0/m_k) \right) \right\}.
\]

Using \( v_j (x) = A_j / x_j \) and \( p^0 = \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j \), for all \( j \), and rearranging, we get

\[
\delta v (x) = \max_{(e_k)_{k=1}^I \in \mathbb{R}_+^I} \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^J \left( a_j - \sum_{k=1}^J A_k \beta_{kj} \right) \ln (x_j) \\
+ \sum_{j=1}^J a_j \ln (e_i) - \left( I \sum_{j=1}^J A_j q_j + c \right) e_i \right\}.
\]

\(^4\)Here and below, we denote \( m^* = \sigma^* (x) = (\sigma^*_1 (x), \sigma^*_2 (x), ..., \sigma^*_I (x)). \)

\(^5\)Here and below, we denote \( m^*/m_i = \left( \sigma^*_1 (x), ..., \sigma^*_i (x), m_i, \sigma^*_i (x), ..., \sigma^*_I (x) \right). \)

\(v_j (x)\) is the partial derivative of \( v (x)\) with respect to \( x_j\).
The control $e_k = e^0$, for $k = i$, satisfies the first order conditions

$$
\left( \sum_{j=1}^{J} a_j \right)/e_i - \left( I \sum_{j=1}^{J} A_j q_j + c \right) = 0,
$$

and, thus, maximizes the RHS of (19). Moreover, as $e_k$, for all $k \neq i$, vanished from the RHS of (19), $e_k = e^0$, for all $k \neq i$, trivially maximizes it.

Thus, substituting $(e_k)_{k=1}^{J} = (e^0)_{k=1}^{J}$ and rearranging, we get

$$
\delta v(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \left[ \left( a_j - \sum_{k=1}^{J} A_k \beta_{kj} \right) \ln(x_j) + a_j \left( \ln(q_j e^0) - 1 \right) + A_j \alpha_j \right].
$$

Using

$$
A_j = (1/\delta) \left[ a_j - \sum_{k=1}^{J} A_k \beta_{kj} \right], \text{ for all } j,
$$

$$
B^0 = (1/\delta) \sum_{j=1}^{J} \left[ a_j \left( \ln(q_j e^0) - 1 \right) + A_j \alpha_j \right],
$$

we can confirm that

$$
v(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{J} A_j \ln(x_j) + B^0.
$$

\section{Conclusion.}

This paper dealt with the regulation of a multispecies fishery exploited under a nonselective harvesting technology. We constructed an economic mechanism capable of implementing an optimal utilization of the resource. This proves that, with adequate institutions, it is possible to delegate the fishery’s management to the fishing industry itself, while avoiding the tragedy of the commons. Moreover, as argued by Arnason (1990), this also helps to economize on information costs, since the regulator does not need to collect datas already available within the fishing industry.

An agenda for future research will be to amend the present economic mechanism to cope with a multispecies fishery exploited under a \textit{selective} harvesting technology. In fact, it seems obvious that the implementation result obtained here can be extended in this direction. All that is needed is to replicate the mechanism used here as many times as the number of selective efforts the fishers can exert to alter the species composition of their catch.

The limits of the approach considered here to regulate fisheries lies on the assumption of rational expectations and perfect rationality. It is supposed throughout in the paper that the fishing industry is able to collect and process all relevant biologic and economic information to foresee all consequences of their current decisions and to behave according to their expectations. Our economic mechanism takes advantage of this to orientate the fishers’ decisions towards an
optimal harvesting path. Of course, if the fishing industry has limited ability to cope with information and expectations, then the proposed approach should perhaps be avoided. Note, however, that the same arguments should also divert us from using individual transferable quotas (Arnason, 1990).

7 References.

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